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JAPAN'S DEFENSE EFFORTS

Talking Paper for the President for his meeting with Prime Minister
Akihito on January 18, 1983

ISSUE

(U) Japan's defense forces are远远 incapable of defending even Japanese territory and surrounding seas and skies; U.S. Forces are too overburdened to provide full local self-defense to the world's second richest country.

BACKGROUND

(U) Despite statements going back to the mid-1950's that Japan should provide for its own territorial self-defense and statements of the 1980s that Japan can legitimately include air and sea-space defense to 3000 miles within its responsibilities, Japan is far from able to carry those tasks.

- (C) The Army and Air Force have obsolete equipment.
- (C) The Army, Navy, and Air Force all have only token levels of combat power.
- (C) The Navy and Air Force are too small to provide for the intended range of abilities for which Japan has recently been asked.

(U) The "overextension and public opinion" have been cited in the past as reasons why Japan must reduce its military forces. Now that these have passed, the Chinese and Soviet threats and fears of other Asian nations continue. Neither of these factors inhibit the pursuit of Japan's self-defense goals.

- (C) Japan needs to do such or public works as it can afford.
- (C) We estimate Japan will achieve its requisite level of self-defense capability within this decade and still spend less than 1% of its GNP on defense.
- (C) Japan cannot fully support Japan's limited defense as long as Japan's security remains tightly latched to the U.S. Pacific presence.

(S) The need for significantly increased Japanese defense efforts in order to participate in a division of labor with the United States has been strongly and specifically pushed from the White House, and some Japanese proponents of the status quo to argue that at the highest levels of the USG don't support increased defense efforts.

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~~DISCUSSION~~

~~(S)~~ For U.S. national a policy, a resolute but strong approach is necessary from the Prime Minister Nakatane, a senior Japanese politician who understands and supports defense. This would provide the Prime Minister the stimulus he needs to initiate a rapid and thorough Japanese reorientation of its defense posture in order to coordinate with the United States in a meaningful division of labor to be achieved within this decade.

- (U) FROM 1045 TO ME PFC WT, THE U.S. HAS PROVIDED FOR JAPAN'S STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE.

- (U) WE WANT TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE FOR JAPAN'S STRATEGIC PROTECTION AND TO PROVIDE FOR JAPAN'S SECURITY IN THE SOUTHWEST ASIA / INDIA / SOUTHEAST ASIA. JAPAN'S COMMERCE WOULD OTHERWISE BE VULNERABLE.

- (U) THE U.S. WILL TAKE STEPS TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE LOCAL DEFENSE IN THE AREA UP TO 100 MILES, BUT COULD NOT PROVIDE A COHERENT DEFENSE OF THE SOVIET BLOC. THIS IS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES INDICATED. THUS DEFERENCE IS SHIPPED.

- ~~(S)~~ JAPAN IS THE ONLY ONE PROVIDING SECURITY IN ASIA, CHINA, INDIA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. A LARGE NAVY AND AIR FORCE ARE NECESSARY BY THE END OF THE DECADE. THE PLAN IS FOR 1990, 81, AND 82 ARE THE CRITICAL YEARS.

(U) THE U.S. IS EXECUTING A POLICY OF DIPLOMACY AND DEFENSE. DIPLOMACY IS THE PRIMARY TOOL IN MAINTAINING SECURITY. DEFENSE SUPPORTS JAPAN'S SECURITY.

~~(S)~~ THE U.S. DEFENSE POLICY CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN ASIA. THE U.S. IS INVOLVED IN A CONFLICT IN THE HUMAN AFFAIRS OF ASIA.

- (U) PRIME MINISTER ASHON AS IT HASIVELY CHAMPIONED THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL FORces AS DECIDED BY PAR. LET US GO BACK TO DC THAT IS NECESSARY IN OUR DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY TESTS.

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